adoption of an alternative ancillary relief scheme. Instead, the article argues the adoption of a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief provision may better ensure the attainment of 'proper provision' in many cases and ought to be afforded serious consideration in Ireland.
A critique of ancillary relief provision on divorce in Ireland
A defining feature of the ancillary relief system applied on divorce in Ireland is the way in which judicial freedom to determine the optimum outcome 'dominates' asset distribution. 9 Adopting an approach based on equitable redistribution, the judiciary are empowered to grant a wide range of financial and property orders (including maintenance, lump sum, property adjustment and pension adjustment orders) reallocating assets between spouses. 10 In choosing to exercise these powers they are afforded the widest possible latitude. The provisions of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 are, as Crowley notes, 'replete with terminology that is designed to maximise the breadth of discretion available to the judiciary in providing for the parties'.
11 Although pursuant to section 20 of the 1996 Act the judiciary are directed to a list of legislative factors which they may consider, the list is non-exhaustive and non-hierarchical with the factors operating simply as 'guidelines'. 12 Moreover, notwithstanding that the judiciary is directed to make 'proper provision' for divorcing spouses as a pre-condition to awarding a decree of divorce, Irish divorce law provisions are 'distinctly silent on the overriding aims of the legislation' 13 and there exists an absence of legislative or judicially-developed principles guiding ancillary relief provision. The court is 'the ultimate and only adjudicator' as to whether an asset ought to be divided and determines the 'nature and scope of any order to be made'.
14 In theory, it would appear such an approach is especially apt in determining ancillary relief provision on divorce. In the absence of rules or firm principles, the judiciary are afforded the freedom to achieve the optimum outcome in the individual circumstances and devise a bespoke package of relief for each couple. In reality, however, such strengths are merely illusory -few divorcing couples receive such judicial attention with only a small fraction of cases, perhaps even as low as 10%, contested in a full court hearing. 15 Moreover, in circumstances where cases do proceed to a full hearing, serious difficulties have arisen in relation to consistency and foreseeability. As Parkinson observed, pursuant to such a highly discretionary system 'judgments are often intuitive rather than reasoned, subjective rather than principled. And judges of experience and intellectual integrity will frequently vary widely in their intuitive sense of a just outcome, making prediction of the result precarious'. 16 In an Irish context, this has proven especially apparent with similar cases frequently resulting in vastly different outcomes. without reference to any starting point or presumption of equal sharing, rather dealt with on a 'case by case basis'. 22 As a result, she concluded:
'[T]he wide discretionary powers applied by the judiciary on separation and divorce, resulted in a considerable variation of approach and outcome. Rather than finding consistent decision making patterns, it was difficult to identify consistency of approach. The outcome was wholly dependent on the individual judge…' She observed, 'family property provisions are not being applied uniformly on a national basis. It seems clear that judges have different views on the provision that is "proper" in family situations, and that there are prevailing local trends'. 25 In particular, having considered the outcomes of contested cases in Dublin, Cork and Galway, she noted the emerging differences 'seemed sufficiently consistent to consider Cork judges likely to be more redistributive than judges in the other two venues'. 
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Effects of inconsistency
Need for reform
In light of the foregoing analysis, it is submitted that the Irish legislature needs to rethink the current approach to ancillary relief provision adopted in Ireland. Despite Maine's belief that rigidity is the mark of a primitive legal order, 45 it is increasingly clear that a more ruleoriented approach may be required to offset the significant shortcomings which have emerged in the equitable redistribution scheme applied. 46 In direct contrast to the highly discretionary approach which currently prevails, the adoption of an alternative system incorporating a more rule-oriented flavour could, if framed appropriately, better promote consistency in judicial decision-making and better facilitate private ordering on divorce. The adoption of such a scheme would also strengthen the position of financially vulnerable spouses on divorce by establishing 'actual rights in the property on behalf of both parties rather than the mere expectation that the court may divide the property in an equitable manner'. 47 As a practical matter, as Brake observed, it would achieve 'more desirable results in the vast majority of cases, while minimising the expenses involved in dividing property'.
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However, before considering how such reform might be framed, the constitutional parameters within which any reform would take place must first be considered. 43 Buckley, above n 5, p73 (emphasis added). 44 O' Shea, above, n 18, pp92-3. While situations may arise which could operate to the detriment of the financially stronger spouse, such as where the financially stronger spouse's wish to divorce is more urgent thereby making them more vulnerable to a big pay-out, even there the financially stronger spouse may be aware of the judges tendency not to review settlements and work on this basis and/or the financially weaker spouse's financial needs may simply prohibit them from pursuing the case to seek the exercise of judicial discretion. 45 the terminology 'proper provision' was specifically chosen in the Constitution to pave the way for the introduction of the current equitable redistribution scheme. 49 However, it is submitted it does not necessarily follow that the equitable redistribution scheme which was subsequently introduced on divorce is the only system of ancillary relief provision which is capable of fulfilling the constitutional pre-condition. Indeed, it may easily be doubted whether the constitutional pre-requisite of 'proper provision' is, in fact, currently being met in Ireland in many cases prior to the award of a decree of divorce. 50 The adoption of a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief, on the other hand, could potentially ensure more fundamental protection, particularly to vulnerable, financially weaker spouses, than the current scheme and better meet the constitutional criterion in the majority of cases.
Constitutional parameters
Furthermore, although residual judicial discretion would certainly have to be retained to satisfy the constitutional limitation, the adoption of a more rule-oriented scheme would also promote greater judicial consistency and better facilitate the majority of divorcing spouses engaged in private bargaining.
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The second issue which arises is the extent to which Ireland can introduce a more ruleoriented approach to property division, specifically. Although it has long been argued that Ireland ought to adopt a rule-based approach to the division of property, 52 the viability of such reform has been subject to considerable doubt. 53 This uncertainty arose primarily due to the constitutional failure of the Matrimonial Home Bill 1993. Section 4 of the 1993 Bill provided that where a spouse was the sole owner of the matrimonial home on the 49 For an overview of the historical development of ancillary relief provision in Ireland, see Crowley, above n 46. 50 See above. 51 Indeed the inclusion of some discretion is, in any case, preferable to rigid rules and flexibility is incorporated in some format in the ancillary relief scheme of almost every jurisdiction, see Crowley, above n 7 and Scherpe above n 36. Furthermore, it has been suggested that issues regarding the separation of powers could arise if the role of the judiciary is removed completely, see L Crowley, 'Equal versus Nevertheless, such fears may be unduly pessimistic. Although clearly the adoption of an immediate community of property style approach would appear likely to require a further constitutional amendment to overcome the issues identified on the referral of the Matrimonial Home Bill, the adoption of a system operating on a deferred basis seems to pose no such threats. 55 Assets would remain held on the basis of title while a marriage subsists -only on divorce would such assets be subject to division. 56 While it may be argued that even the division of matrimonial property on divorce would constitute an unjustified intrusion on the autonomy of the family, such intrusion would be committed in the pursuit of making 'proper provision' for spouses, as constitutionally mandated by Article 41.3.2°:
since property adjustments orders are accepted as constitutionally-sound on this basis, so too would the division of assets pursuant to a deferred community of property style scheme.
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Additionally, although it might be suggested that the imposition of a rule of property division on divorce could be deemed an unjustified assault on the property rights of a wealthier spouse, this again cannot survive scrutiny. Pursuant to the current scheme, the property rights of a wealthier spouse are much more subject to attack with all property up for grabs and no limitation on the judiciary as to what inroads would be made on them. A tentative proposal for reform 59 In seeking to reform the highly discretionary ancillary relief scheme currently applied in Ireland, broad proposals advocating the incorporation of rules or quasi-rules for the sharing of property have received considerable support at a theoretical level. 60 However, notwithstanding that the introduction of a more rule-oriented approach to property division would appear to be a viable option for reform if framed correctly, and would certainly represent a welcome development in Irish law, it is clear that such reform would, without more, be unlikely to afford sufficient protection for financially weaker spouses, notably women.
It is increasingly evident that the application of a strict equal (property) division rule can, in fact, sometimes lead to the further impoverishment of women, worsening their condition in respect of men and widening the income gap between the genders. 61 In particular, such an approach may provide an insufficient remedy to counteract the economic disparity which often exists between spouses at the point of divorce. Unfortunately, it appears such a threat is especially acute in Ireland. Recent research which analysed work patterns of male and female partners in couple households (including though not limited to married couples),
highlighted that despite the shift away from the traditional male breadwinner work pattern, characterised by male partner full-time work and female partner joblessness or part-time work, the male breadwinner model continued to exist in 38% of couple households.
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Female breadwinner households, although increased, were much less common and only recorded in 9% of couple households. 63 Crucially, the financially inferior position of many women arising from this reduced labour market participation is compounded by the considerable challenges they face when seeking to return to the workforce, particularly after a period of full-time caring, and the negative effect this reduced participation has on their 59 Although this proposal draws inspiration from a number of sources, most notably past and present regimes applied in British Columbia, Canada (see the Family Relations Act 1996 and the Family Law Act 2011) the proposal is novel and does not replicate any existing regime. 60 See above n 52. 61 For an early argument to this effect, see L Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution (Free Press, 1985) pp70-109. Although in the interim her statistics have been subject to some criticism, Crowley, above n 7, p391 notes 'it appears well-established that the economic consequences of divorce are significantly worse for long-term homemakers and their children than they are for the breadwinner spouse'. (1) IJFL 15 who noted that although 'the judiciary recognises the role of the women in the home, this recognition has different implications for women with different levels of education. The beneficiaries were women who were in a position to adopt a professional working life. However, women with fewer educational advantages, who will remain in the home after marital breakdown, are not rewarded equally by the judiciary.' Therefore, poorer outcomes for home-makers appeared to be attributed to a failure to value domestic contributions rather than issues connected with relationship-generated loss and compensation. property sharing, spousal support and allocation of the family home.
Property sharing
The development of a more rule-oriented approach to property division at the point of divorce would be welcome in Ireland, from both a practical and a symbolic perspective. In addition to vesting financially weaker spouses with an entitlement to a share of family assets and providing much greater predictability, the adoption of pre-defined equal sharing would
give greater effect to the view that marriage is a partnership and better recognise the joint efforts of the couple. In devising what assets ought to be captured in the community for sharing, these rationales must be reflected. However, other needs must also be considered in determining how the community for sharing ought to be classified. In particular, the need One way in which greater theoretical consistency might be achieved would be by viewing the rationales as distinct and independent with each justifying the sharing of two different categories of assets. The entitlement to a share in one category of assets might arise as a consequence of marriage (reflecting partnership), while the rationale for sharing another category of assets might be contribution-based (reflecting joint efforts). What constitutes a 'family asset', shared as a consequence of marriage, could perhaps be determined by a functional test based on whether the asset was ordinarily used for a family purpose.
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Pursuant to such an approach, and as befits its special position in other areas of Irish matrimonial property law, the family home would automatically fall within this category. Moreover, building on recent studies in England and Wales which have shown that how money is held and under whose name is not necessarily determinative of the intentions of the parties', bank accounts used for a family purpose would also be shared. 76 The date or method of acquisition of these assets would be irrelevant as it is contended that ordinarily using property for a family purpose demonstrates the central importance of the asset to the martial partnership and is subject to division on that basis.
Notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, however, such an approach has faced opposition in recent times. 77 One of the key concerns which has been raised is that such a scheme could cause spouses to shield assets from use to prevent their sharing should the marriage flounder. However, it is submitted that by specifying certain assets which are considered to be at the heart of the matrimonial consortium and which will be presumptively subject to sharing, such as the family home, in the majority of cases such shielding will be irrelevantin the 'average' case, the core assets of the partnership will be captured automatically within the community for sharing. A second issue which has been raised is that difficulties could be encountered in the application of a functional test for characterising such assets. Despite this, it is arguable that many of these problems could be offset at the outset through the inclusion of legislative guidelines to aid in the identification process. The guidelines could specify the date on which an asset ought to be characterised and when the asset ought to be legislation could include an explicit statement that work in the home creates a rebuttable presumption that an indirect contribution was made to the pension/business. 79 In this category, if the asset was acquired before marriage or was a gift or inheritance, it is arguable that only the increased value of the asset ought to be subject to division. 80 In addition, reflecting the fact that 'the actual value of most non-pecuniary contributions, especially homemaking, is implicitly linked to duration', 81 the sharing of quasi-family assets pursuant to such a system could be subject to temporal accretion. 82 Drawing on empirical research elsewhere in support of such an approach, 83 the regime could be tailored to ensure equal sharing of quasi-family assets would only be achieved after five years of marriage with a spouse accruing a 10% share each year until the fifth year. The main benefits of adopting such a scale would be to minimise the applications to court for a departure from equal sharing where the marriage was short on the basis that equal sharing is unfair and, simultaneously, to retain certainty in the default rules.
Notwithstanding their presumptive application, however, it is arguable that residual judicial discretion ought to be retained to allow for departures from these 'rules' where necessary.
To this end, building on the fundamental distinction in the rationales for sharing family and quasi-family assets, clear and justifiable grounds for departing from equal sharing may be designed to respond to situations where a reapportionment of shares may be appropriate.
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For instance, in order to avoid the danger of assuming domestic contributions are in every case equal, quasi-family assets ought to be subject to reapportionment where the temporal 79 No link would need to be evidenced between the actual indirect contributions and the business. However, contributions would be subject to the de minimus principle. 80 The exclusion of such assets is 'becoming increasingly common in common law jurisdictions', see J Scherpe and J Miles in Eekelaar and George (eds) above n 70, p144. Moreover, in an Irish context, inheritance can be a factor in whether or not assets ought to be divided, see 82 Having an incremental scale (for quasi-family assets) would seem to fit with the approach of the Irish courts as identified by O' Shea, above n 18, p121 where she noted 'The Circuit Court did generally recognise the contributions of the wife, in accordance with Article 41.2.1., where there were children and a long-term marriage.' Note, although this approach would also fit with the contributionbased rationale for sharing assets pursuant to this proposal, it would not be appropriate in the sharing of family assets which is justified by the partnership view of marriage. 83 84 Somewhat similarly, albeit in reverse, see s 9 of the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985 which expressly identifies statutory criteria which must be satisfied in order to justify making any financial order as discussed in Crowley, above n 7, pp391-394.
accretion model gives rise to a result which is 'clearly unfair' having regard, for instance, to the extent of the contributions made.
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The inclusion of an explicit rationale for sharing may also be used to justify not departing from equal sharing in certain circumstances. If the entitlement to equal shares of family or quasi-family assets is afforded on the basis that it gives effect to the partnership rationale or in recognition of contributions, the reapportionment of such assets on the basis of a spousal 'need', at least as a de fault measure, might not appear appropriate. Nevertheless, given the broad gamut of family situations which exist, residual discretion ought, perhaps, to be vested in the judiciary to divide any assets (community assets or otherwise) where not to do so would, again, be 'clearly unfair' having regard to specified criteria.
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Admittedly, a dual-categorisation approach such as that proposed here does not represent the most straightforward method of categorising assets falling into the community for sharing and undoubtedly prioritises the need for theoretical consistency at the expense of simplicity. However, although more user-friendly approaches do exist, notably the community of acquests regime, such a model can be both over-and under-inclusive. The adoption of the approach presented here, by contrast, would better ensure justifiable grounds for sharing, and departures therefrom, are established. It would, moreover, when used in conjunction with proposed guidelines, better facilitate consistent judicial decisionmaking where sought and represent a more transparent approach to asset division.
87
Finally, while it is submitted that spouses ought to be capable of contracting out of any such regime on obtaining independent legal advice, 88 the constitutional pre-condition of 'proper provision' for a decree of divorce would require that where an opt out is availed of, the 85 See E Cooke, 'Miller/McFarlane: Law in Search of Discrimination' (2007) 19 CFLQ 98, 101. However, it is submitted in most cases such contributions would be considered equal. 86 What these criteria are would have to be carefully considered and would, no doubt, be reflective of the overall policy direction of any such reform. One ground for departure which is included in a number of jurisdictions is if there was a considerable disparity in the value of the assets held by each spouse at the end of the relationship. 87 Although the scope of the community for sharing might, in larger value cases, appear somewhat conservative, it is submitted that such an approach is more in line with the development of matrimonial property law in Ireland to date which has been built on incremental progress towards entitlement-based provision. For general discussion of the movement of family law from a welfare based approach to an entitlement based approach, see Eekelaar, above n 81. 88 An opt-out clause is already in place in Irish matrimonial property law as it is possible to contract out of an entitlement to the legal right share, see s 113 of the Succession Act 1965.
current equitable redistribution scheme would once again come into play to ensure such provision is made for a dependent spouse.
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Spousal support
The second issue or 'pillar' which must be considered is that of spousal support. As noted, it has become increasingly apparent that mere equal sharing of assets often proves insufficient to respond to the economic vulnerability of financially weaker spouses on divorce and may fail to ensure an economically just outcome is achieved. Where the economic vulnerability of one spouse, often the wife, arises by virtue of the greater workload taken on in the home and in caring for children, it ought, in particular, to be addressed. which spousal support ought to fall is extracted. 101 However, discretion also remains to depart from the ranges produced where certain specified 'exceptions' apply. 100 The amount and duration of support increases incrementally with the length of the marriage. 101 The need for software causes specific problems for those litigants who do not have legal representation. However, solutions are being sought as noted in Rogerson and Thomson, above n 92, p266, however it is hoped free online software will become available to complete these calculations. 102 These may include illness, disability, disproportionate losses or gains in a short marriage, et cetera.
Despite their non-legislative status, the SSAG have proven remarkably successful. The guidelines, which recognise 'a very generous basis for spousal support', 103 are now 'widely accepted and used by both lawyers and judges across the country'. 104 The guidelines have facilitated the development of more consistent judicial decision-making and by identifying 'outliers' -decisions deemed 'at odds with nationwide trends' which had formerly been 'covered' by the wide discretion afforded to the judiciary -has effectively exposed such outcomes 'forcing change or explanation'. 105 The introduction of the SSAG also appears to have been particularly useful in better ensuring adequate provision for financially vulnerable spouses and reducing, where possible, the damaging economic consequences of divorce. 
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Cognisant of these practical benefits, it is submitted that the Irish legislature ought to also seriously consider adopting such an approach, ideally at a statutory level. 113 Similar guidelines, founded on equivalent research as to the range of appropriate outcomes in the jurisdiction, would be especially welcome in providing more robust protection to vulnerable financially weaker spouses while simultaneously presenting a more transparent, consistent and settlement-friendly approach to spousal support. 114 In determining what precise guidelines ought to be adopted, 'trade-offs between simplicity and efficiency, on the one hand, and more finely tuned justice on the other hand' 115 would, necessarily, be required.
However, the adoption of a more formulaic approach premised on the provision of ranges of outcomes, with the simultaneous retention of judicial discretion to achieve a different outcome where appropriate, would avoid the charge that such prescribed formulae are too rigid while nonetheless ensuring that settlements may be better reached in the shadow of the law.
promotes the cessation of financial ties between spouses, does not currently exist in the jurisdiction and the Irish judiciary have, in many cases, actively discouraged any such development. 117 Notwithstanding the viability of such on-going support, however, periodical payments might not be appropriate or desirable for former spouses in every case.
Consequently, while the above scheme would provide much greater clarity in the quantification of spousal support, where spousal support is inappropriate, perhaps due the possibility of non-compliance or a desire for clean break, it is strongly suggested that it ought to be possible to convert spousal support into an interest in property or lump sum payment.
This could give rise to an unequal division of assets, notably the family home, albeit not by virtue of a reapportionment per se but rather a reconfiguration of the overall package.
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Family home
Once issues in relation to property division and spousal support have been resolved, it is then often necessary to determine how the actual assets are divided, whether the family home is to be sold or, if not, to whom the property is allocated. In this regard, it is highly 118 This ability to reconfigure the overall package is important in light of empirical evidence which demonstrates the desire of many Irish couples to include some element of clean break, by capitalising the value of the support or pension payments or converting such relief into an interest in property where possible, see Courts Service, above n 15. See also Buckley, above n 5. Such 'restructuring' is also possible in Canada, see Rogerson, above n106. 119 Above n 52, p74. This fear was also highlighted by Dewar, above n37, p309. 120 See Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996, s 15(2)(b). 121 Where there are dependent children, the award of exclusive occupation, as Miles notes, is really 'an aspect of provision for the child rather than for the spouse', see Law Commission for England and Wales, above n 31, para3.45. Where there are no children, but a spouse wishes to remain in the home, such an order could be made in full or partial satisfaction of the recipient spouse's entitlements under the proposal. In order to ensure an accurate valuation of the benefit arising from the order, actuarial calculations would have to take place. Alternatively, if such an order was made in addition to the spousal support and property entitlements of the recipient spouse, and not as part of a reconfigured package, it would represent additional provision on the basis of need.
clear popularity of such orders in the Irish courts. 122 Although such an approach would again vest discretion with the judiciary, the inclusion of a welfare objective ought, in theory, to ensure a clear line of authority emerging from the courts which would in turn lend itself to facilitating separation agreements and post-separation arrangements for the family home.
Should residual discretion vest in the court?
While the adoption of the scheme presented here, or a variant thereof, would ensure a more comprehensive, transparent and, ideally, consistent approach to financial provision and property division on divorce, it is still possible that given the great variety of family circumstances which exist the overall suite of entitlements and remedies may not achieve economic justice in certain outlier cases. Therefore, it is arguable that residual discretion ought to reside in the judiciary to adjust the overall provision made between spouses pursuant to the above regime. To this end, a number of objectives of the overall regulatory process may be enumerated against which financial and property settlements are, at the final stage, judged. 123 Where these objectives are not met, discretion may be exercised to achieve more individualised justice.
What these objectives ought to be will naturally be a matter of debate and policy choice.
Although the adoption of a formulaic spousal support scheme such as that suggested here involves a relatively strong compensatory element, given the somewhat mechanical nature of such an approach, it may be felt that residual judicial discretion ought to be retained to ensure the regime effectively achieves this goal where required. Moreover, while an ancillary relief regime such as that proposed emphasizes the role of the payee as a deserving claimant rather than a 'needy supplicant', and notwithstanding the desire to prioritise compensation over need which has emerged in academic literature, 124 it is arguable that (for both practical and political purposes) limited residual discretion may also be required to be vested in the judiciary to respond in certain cases to need not captured by spousal support nor offset by the entitlements provided. As a result, the inclusion of both need and compensation-based objectives may be considered necessary.
Advantages of the proposal
122 O' Shea, above n 18, p175. Crowley, above n 12, p632 notes 'it is well settled that where there are younger children and where it is financially permissible, that the parent with custody should remain in the family home'. 123 For analysis of the importance of objective-driven discretion, see Crowley, above n7. 124 See Ellman, above n 90; Miles, above n 28.
The adoption of a proposal, akin to that presented, would carry with it a number of advantages, from both a practical and a theoretical perspective.
Better facilitates consistency, predictability and the attainment of 'proper provision'
A key advantage of this proposal is that, if framed appropriately, such reform should allow for greater consistency and predictability in the provision of ancillary relief in Ireland. As
Parkinson has noted:
'Predictability in the law is important in order to ensure that lawyers can confidently
give advice on the likely outcome of a case if it is litigated. As Birks (citation omitted) wrote in another context: "It is essential in modern society that the law be closely and cogently reasoned. Access to the courts is hugely expensive. An expensive palm tree is no use to the people. The law must be so stated as to facilitate prediction and advice. It is impossible otherwise to plan with confidence. And it is impossible to know when to litigate." The fewer the palm trees in family law, the better.'
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In particular, such reform would place financially weaker spouses in a much stronger position in court applications and, especially, in private ordering, while simultaneously better ensuring fairness in a general sense. Moreover, despite incorporating important rules and frameworks in the division of property and the calculation of spousal support, the proposal retains important discretionary powers for the judiciary at key stages of the process, thereby retaining essential flexibility. Although it may be argued that the inclusion of even residual discretion would be liable to undermine the certainty on which such a regime would be founded, the inclusion of a clear objective(s) to which the judiciary would be required to have regard in exercising this discretion would better ensure a clear line of authority emerging from the courts. The overall aim of such a proposal would be to better facilitate the attainment of 'proper provision' in the vast majority of cases than appears to be the situation pursuant to the current scheme despite, perhaps, no longer placing such provision as the explicit objective. [I]n ordinary cases, the fact that the parties' needs will be determinative may make notionally starting at 50:50 appear pointless. Even here, however, there may be something intangible (and, more concretely, an enhancement of bargaining position) to be gained from the idea that each party is prima facie entitled to an equal share of the capital and that a non-owner applicant is not merely a "needy supplicant".' (Emphasis original). Consequently, as Buckley observes, it is becoming clearer that the justification for the delimitation of property rights in the marital breakdown context lies 'in the nature of the family itself rather than on the connected but distinct social policy objective of combatting hardship and consequent social ills in the post-marital breakdown context'. 132 The inclusion of provisions entitling spouses to a share of community assets, on the basis of partnership and/or contributions, therefore, builds on this developing judicial recognition and better supports the constitutional protection of the family.
Better supports Article 41 of the Constitution
Better ensures theoretical consistency
Finally, the adoption of a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief provision would provide much needed theoretical consistency to the overall matrimonial property scheme applied in Ireland. Although, at first blush, Irish law appears to be strongly separationist, as exemplified by the equitable redistribution scheme applied on divorce, communitarian principles actually pervade many other areas of Irish matrimonial property law.
Unlike the majority of common law jurisdictions, Ireland operates a regime of forced heirship on death pursuant to the Succession Act 1965. Significantly curtailing a testator's freedom of disposition, section 111 provides that where a testator leaves a spouse and no children, the surviving spouse has an automatic right to one-half of the entire estate.
Alternatively, where the testator leaves a spouse and children, the spouse is entitled to onethird of the estate. Moreover, the comprehensive protection afforded to non-owning spouses pursuant to the Family Home Protection Act 1976, restricting the unilateral disposition of the family home, is another feature regularly associated with civil law, communitarian regimes and is again founded on communitarian principles. 133 Although the impetus for the introduction of these legislative enactments may have been support/protection based, 134 their overall effect is no doubt to incorporate communitarian principles during a relationship and on death.
Despite subsequently falling at the constitutional hurdle, the Matrimonial Home Bill 1993
was also 'specifically predicated on partnership ideals' 135 and followed much support for a more communitarian approach to the ownership of matrimonial property, particularly the family home, in the Irish legislature. 138 The protection of the matrimonial home was, she noted, a 'matter of priority' in this regard. 139 Indeed, notwithstanding the lack of a legislatively or judicially-developed principle of equality, a scheme based on equitable redistribution, similar to a community of property approach, also facilitates sharing out of a community fund on marriage dissolution 140 and is based on the view that marriage is a partnership. However, there is a spectrum of interference in matrimonial property regulation giving effect to the view of marriage as a partnership and recognising the joint efforts of the couple. The two approaches are at different points on that spectrum. 141 Irish law has been inching further along the continuum since the introduction of the Succession Act 1965 and it is submitted it is time to continue the journey.
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Conclusion
The political difficulties of tampering with family law have long been observed. Maclean and Eekelaar note, 'As society becomes more fluid and more diverse, the chances of creating a new family law which will not offend the private values and expectations of a significant number of potential voters become slimmer and slimmer.' 143 Moreover, in the specific area of ancillary relief, it has been noted, albeit in relation to Australia, 'how difficult it can be to change the law … and how attached family law professionals are to the now traditional technique of wide-ranging judicial discretion'. 144 Yet, notwithstanding the political challenges involved in effecting change in relation to ancillary relief provision, it is clear such reform (or, at minimum, a comprehensive legislative review) is required as a priority in Ireland. It has been observed:
'Family Law functions in a paternalistic and patriarchal way by intervening in the private sphere of the family in order to protect vulnerable members of that family unit, particularly when the family unit begins to break down. Here, there are two defined protective roles: physical protection and economic protection.' 145 Unfortunately, it is evident from the above that there are clear shortcomings in the highly discretionary approach to ancillary relief applied in Ireland pursuant to the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996 which appear to be leaving financially weaker spouses potentially void of such 'economic protection'. In order to overcome these weaknesses, while simultaneously promoting consistency in judicial outcomes and facilitating parties reaching a fair settlement in an informal setting, what we need in Ireland are a priori declarations about the rights and responsibilities to which marriage gives rise, encapsulated within a more rule-oriented system of ancillary relief. However, although the Irish Government clearly supports the development of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the family law sphere, 146 whether this will actually translate into reform initiatives to better achieve these aims, akin to those suggested above, appears doubtful. In particular, it has been noted, ' The likelihood of a legislative initiative by government to provide for a regime of community of property in the future is minimal. While a system of community of property is in force in a variety of forms in a number of States, the practical and legal difficulties involved in superimposing such a system on a common law jurisdiction in which a regime of independent property ownership has been in operation for over a hundred years would be enormous'.
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It is contended much of this scepticism as to the viability of reform on the basis of a more rule-oriented approach is due to a fundamental misunderstanding of the constitutional parameters which limit ancillary relief reform in Ireland and, equally, the ability to retain important flexibility in an otherwise rule-oriented system.
Buckley noted in 2002: 'To date, the focus in Ireland has been on ameliorating existing rules, rather than on revising the nature of the system itself -on remedying individual instances of injustice, rather than on providing a prescription for the just ownership of marital property.' 148 As we approach the 20 th anniversary of the introduction of divorce in Ireland, it is strongly argued the time has come for a comprehensive rethink about how we address ancillary relief in the jurisdiction and how we intend to overcome the significant shortcomings which have emerged in the application of the Family Law (Divorce) Act 1996.
In this exercise, it is contended we must afford serious consideration, perhaps for the first time, to the opportunities presented by a more rule-oriented approach to ancillary relief provision.
